U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein - The Danger of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development

U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein

- The Danger of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development -
Center for Defense Information
May 14, 2003

Thank you Bruce [Blair] for that kind introduction. And thanks to everyone here today for the important work you are doing with the Center for Defense Information to further U.S. national security interests.

Tonight, I would like to address the dangers posed by the Bush Administration's unilateralism, its policy of military preemption, and its move to renew and further develop its nuclear arsenal.

To my mind, of all the myriad challenges facing the United States, none is greater than national security. In the wake of 9/11, the White House has articulated a new, and in many ways, revolutionary approach to U.S. foreign policy.

So revolutionary, in fact, that a couple weeks ago, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright told Democratic Senators: in all of American history there never has been a greater change in foreign policy and national security than between the Clinton and Bush Administrations.

Indeed, America is now at a decisive crossroad. And I stand before you today to express my concern about the direction the Bush Administration is taking.

The world, today, is much more complex than during the Cold War, when it was symmetrically divided into two camps. We now face asymmetric threats that geography and political borders do not contain.

We no longer fear the threat of all-out nuclear war, but the likelihood that America will be attacked with a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon has increased.

I think President Bush is right when he says that the greatest threat facing the United States lies in the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist access to those weapons.

But by adopting a policy of unilateralism and preemption, by undermining international law and institutions, and by increasing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, the Administration may actually encourage the proliferation we seek to prevent.

At the same time, the Administration's policies are prompting a serious backlash against the United States.

After 9/11 there was an immediate show of support for the United States by the rest of the world. The French newspaper Le Monde printed a headline "We Are All Americans Now."

But the United States has lost much of the good will since then, both in the way the Administration approached the war in Iraq and because of a growing perception that the Administration's attitude is one of America always knows best.

This unilateral approach and strategy stands in sharp contrast to a successful bipartisan tradition born out of World War II - a tradition of supporting a world ordered by law, with capable international institutions and reciprocal restraints on action.

In the long run, I deeply believe that this new strategy undermines U.S. security and may well make the world more dangerous, not safer.

Tonight, I want to share with you my response and concerns about major changes in foreign and national security policies now taking place.

Four key documents released in the year following 9/11 laid out the President's unprecedented new policies:

the Nuclear Posture Review, put out in January 2002;
the Doctrine of Preemption, which the President first broached himself in a commencement address at West Point in June 2002;
the Administration's National Security Strategy, released in September 2002; and

•the National Security Policy Document 17, signed by the President in September 2002.

Nuclear Weapons

In January 2002, the Pentagon released the Nuclear Posture Review. Despite subsequent efforts to downplay the document's significance, it represents, in my view, the beginning of a new era of nuclear contemplation and the possible use of nuclear weapons in the future.

The bottom line is that certain events might compel the United States to use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear states and a blurring of the line between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Posture Review specifically discusses situations in which the United States would engage in a first use of nuclear weapons. These include "a North Korean attack on South Korea, or military confrontation over the status of Taiwan."

And it addresses contingencies in which the United States might use nuclear weapons - not in retaliation for a nuclear strike on the United States - but to destroy enemy stocks of chemical or biological arms.

It calls for the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear warheads, including low yield or so-called "mini-nukes."

Earlier today, at a Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld about the Administration's request for funds for a study of the development of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

He said, in essence, that it was "just a study" and did not mean the Administration planned to develop or deploy these weapons.

Yet the Nuclear Posture Review states that "new capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats....Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative...."

And now, the President's Congressional allies have added $15 million for research and testing of the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator" to the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill.

The bill, recently approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee, would also repeal the 10-year-old Spratt-Furse Amendment, which has prohibited any research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons.

It would also authorize $6 million to research other advanced nuclear concepts and $25 million to resume, if necessary, the nuclear testing program.

And it would lessen the time it would take to prepare to conduct a nuclear test from three years to 18 months.

The House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday essentially fenced the language allowing research only to continue on low-yield nuclear weapons.

But the committee also shortened the preparation time for a nuclear test from three years to 18 months.

The United States has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992, and such testing is barred by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the United States signed in 1996. So this would be a significant change.

We see all these little pieces - a study here, a test requirement there - perhaps minor when considered separately. But when you start to connect the dots, a very disturbing picture starts to emerge.

We do not yet know how these issues will play out on the floor of the House and the Senate. But the likelihood is that they will be approved.

The development of low-yield nuclear weapons offers the United States no decisive military advantage, while, I believe it has potentially grave international repercussions.

According to Stanford University physicist Sidney Drell - considered an expert in this field - destroying a target dug 1,000 feet into rock would require a nuclear weapon with a yield of 100 kilotons - that's almost 10 times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Even the effects of a small bomb would be dramatic. A 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 20-50 feet underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air.

Does anybody believe that if the United States were to develop such a weapon, other countries would not follow?

Would that make the world safer?

In fact, this Administration seems to be moving toward a military posture in which nuclear weapons are considered just like other weapons.

Their purpose is not simply to serve as a deterrent. But they would be a usable instrument of military power, like a tank, a fighter aircraft, or a cruise missile.

The effect of such a development could well be to legitimize the production of these new nuclear bombs by other countries and make them that much more likely to fall into the hands of enemy states or terrorist groups.

At the same time, the Nuclear Posture Review expands the countries included as possible targets, mentioning that "North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies…"

Although I would not defend any of these regimes, with the exception of North Korea, none are nuclear powers. These "contingencies" really point to a first use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state.

And, in September of last year, a National Security Presidential Directive, known as NSPD 17, reversed the long-standing policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding United States use of nuclear weapons.

Previous administrations of both political parties, when faced with an uncertain world, have made ambiguous public statements about the United States reserving the right to consider "all options" without any specificity as to which options, or under what conditions.

But together, these two new policy initiatives cite contingencies for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons or the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation to a non-nuclear attack.

I believe that such an approach is not in our nation's interest, nor is it consistent with our standards and values.

In this day and age, a first use of nuclear weapons by the United States should be unthinkable, and responding to a non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons violates a central tenet of just war and U.S. military tradition.

There is no question that in the post 9/11 era a full range of policy options for dealing with new and uncertain events should be on the table.

But in my view, nuclear options should not be considered as an extension of conventional options because this inevitably lowers the threshold for use - not necessarily by us, but by others.

And our own policies might convince the very nations we are seeking to dissuade from developing nuclear arsenals that they need nuclear bombs to protect themselves against a U.S. attack.

Indeed, at a time when the United States brands as "evil" certain countries based, in part, on their pursuit of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, we must be especially careful in how we consider our own options and contingencies regarding nuclear weapons.

Doctrine of Preemption and National Security Strategy

In his commencement address at West Point in June 2002, the President called upon all Americans - and I quote: "to be forward - looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives....If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long."

This theme was further developed in the National Security Strategy, published in September of last year, which argues that: "the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past...."

It goes on to say: "We cannot let our enemies strike first....The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves."

On their face, I agree with these statements. I believe that, in fact, as a tactical matter there may be situations where the United States may have to strike first against an imminent threat.

However, by creating a specific preemption strategy, and by adapting the concept of "imminent threat" to threats not "fully formed" or to cases where, one day, a foreign government may be a threat to the United States, we set a precedent for others which may well come back to haunt us.

It may well lead to a less stable and a more dangerous world.

What lessons are others to draw from our words and our actions?

For instance, the Administration has stated that one of its top foreign policy goals is to create conditions in which China ultimately becomes an integral part of the world community and adheres to international law and norms of conduct.

But what lesson is China to learn from the policy of preemption and the Nuclear Posture Review which set up the contingency for possible nuclear attack on China, if it were to use military action against Taiwan?

The Administration's decision to deploy missile defense and to exercise its preemptive doctrine, when combined with the lower thresholds for nuclear use, could well spur China to further expand its own nuclear arsenal, which has been stable at anywhere from 18 to 24 ICBMs.

As you know, China has expressed a strong "no first use" policy. It is clearly not in America's interest to see this policy changed and have China deploy hundreds or even thousands of new ICBMs.

This would have a disturbing effect not just on U.S.-China relations, but on the entire Asian security environment. Japan could follow, and develop nuclear weapons - South Korea, too, and what about Taiwan?

This is the sort of troubling scenario to which the Administration's policies may lead if we are not careful.

Conclusion

Countering weapons of mass destruction is an international task.

More than a dozen countries around the world are believed to be seeking chemical or biological weapons.

Even more dangerous, the fissile material needed to build a nuclear weapon is scattered worldwide among our friends and enemies, in places like Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea.

The United States needs a strong military and needs to be prepared to use it.

But addressing terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires many tools, including sustained and effective alliances and protocols which are enforceable among cooperating nations.

The Administration's policy of unilateralism and preemption runs the risk that the United States will become increasingly isolated and alone with alliances and treaties diminishing as effective mechanisms.

Instead, the United States will become overly dependent on its military might to protect its interests and its citizens.

So today, we stand at an important point in our history.

Will the United States recommit our nation to the achievement of workable democratic structures for international law and international institutions, norms of behavior and conduct that others are willing to accept?

Or will we turn away from the successful bipartisan tradition of supporting a world ordered by law, and pursue, instead, a unilateralist path?

I deeply believe that this Administration is heading into uncharted territory, without adequate reflection or consultation with Congress or our allies.

So, it is time to raise the warning flags.

As we set a future course for this nation, we should remember that the hallmark of success of America's national security strategy flows from who we are, not just what our military can do.

Our strength emanates from our moral stature and our beliefs in truth, in justice, and in freedom.

If the long-term goal of our foreign policy is to help build a world where we have more allies than adversaries, more friends than enemies, and more prosperity than poverty, a doctrine of unilateral preemptive military action will most certainly work against that goal.

The voices of reason and restraint can still prevail.

It will be very interesting to see what happens.

And what happens, I believe, over the next several weeks and months could well define how this nation is perceived for generations to come.



	U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein - The Danger of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development - Center for Defense Information May 14, 2003 Thank you Bruce [Blair] for that kind introduction. And thanks to everyone here today for the important work you are doing with the Center for Defense Information to further U.S. national security interests. Tonight, I would like to address the dangers posed by the Bush Administration's unilateralism, its policy of military preemption, and its move to renew and further develop its nuclear arsenal. To my mind, of all the myriad challenges facing the United States, none is greater than national security. In the wake of 9/11, the White House has articulated a new, and in many ways, revolutionary approach to U.S. foreign policy. So revolutionary, in fact, that a couple weeks ago, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright told Democratic Senators: in all of American history there never has been a greater change in foreign policy and national security than between the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Indeed, America is now at a decisive crossroad. And I stand before you today to express my concern about the direction the Bush Administration is taking. The world, today, is much more complex than during the Cold War, when it was symmetrically divided into two camps. We now face asymmetric threats that geography and political borders do not contain. We no longer fear the threat of all-out nuclear war, but the likelihood that America will be attacked with a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon has increased. I think President Bush is right when he says that the greatest threat facing the United States lies in the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist access to those weapons. But by adopting a policy of unilateralism and preemption, by undermining international law and institutions, and by increasing U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, the Administration may actually encourage the proliferation we seek to prevent. At the same time, the Administration's policies are prompting a serious backlash against the United States. After 9/11 there was an immediate show of support for the United States by the rest of the world. The French newspaper Le Monde printed a headline "We Are All Americans Now." But the United States has lost much of the good will since then, both in the way the Administration approached the war in Iraq and because of a growing perception that the Administration's attitude is one of America always knows best. This unilateral approach and strategy stands in sharp contrast to a successful bipartisan tradition born out of World War II - a tradition of supporting a world ordered by law, with capable international institutions and reciprocal restraints on action. In the long run, I deeply believe that this new strategy undermines U.S. security and may well make the world more dangerous, not safer. Tonight, I want to share with you my response and concerns about major changes in foreign and national security policies now taking place. Four key documents released in the year following 9/11 laid out the President's unprecedented new policies: the Nuclear Posture Review, put out in January 2002; the Doctrine of Preemption, which the President first broached himself in a commencement address at West Point in June 2002; the Administration's National Security Strategy, released in September 2002; and •the National Security Policy Document 17, signed by the President in September 2002. Nuclear Weapons In January 2002, the Pentagon released the Nuclear Posture Review. Despite subsequent efforts to downplay the document's significance, it represents, in my view, the beginning of a new era of nuclear contemplation and the possible use of nuclear weapons in the future. The bottom line is that certain events might compel the United States to use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear states and a blurring of the line between the use of conventional and nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review specifically discusses situations in which the United States would engage in a first use of nuclear weapons. These include "a North Korean attack on South Korea, or military confrontation over the status of Taiwan." And it addresses contingencies in which the United States might use nuclear weapons - not in retaliation for a nuclear strike on the United States - but to destroy enemy stocks of chemical or biological arms. It calls for the development of a new generation of U.S. nuclear warheads, including low yield or so-called "mini-nukes." Earlier today, at a Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee hearing, I asked Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld about the Administration's request for funds for a study of the development of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. He said, in essence, that it was "just a study" and did not mean the Administration planned to develop or deploy these weapons. Yet the Nuclear Posture Review states that "new capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats....Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative...." And now, the President's Congressional allies have added $15 million for research and testing of the "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator" to the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill. The bill, recently approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee, would also repeal the 10-year-old Spratt-Furse Amendment, which has prohibited any research and development on low-yield nuclear weapons. It would also authorize $6 million to research other advanced nuclear concepts and $25 million to resume, if necessary, the nuclear testing program. And it would lessen the time it would take to prepare to conduct a nuclear test from three years to 18 months. The House Armed Services Committee on Tuesday essentially fenced the language allowing research only to continue on low-yield nuclear weapons. But the committee also shortened the preparation time for a nuclear test from three years to 18 months. The United States has not conducted a nuclear test since 1992, and such testing is barred by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the United States signed in 1996. So this would be a significant change. We see all these little pieces - a study here, a test requirement there - perhaps minor when considered separately. But when you start to connect the dots, a very disturbing picture starts to emerge. We do not yet know how these issues will play out on the floor of the House and the Senate. But the likelihood is that they will be approved. The development of low-yield nuclear weapons offers the United States no decisive military advantage, while, I believe it has potentially grave international repercussions. According to Stanford University physicist Sidney Drell - considered an expert in this field - destroying a target dug 1,000 feet into rock would require a nuclear weapon with a yield of 100 kilotons - that's almost 10 times the size of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Even the effects of a small bomb would be dramatic. A 1-kiloton nuclear weapon detonated 20-50 feet underground would dig a crater the size of Ground Zero in New York and eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris into the air. Does anybody believe that if the United States were to develop such a weapon, other countries would not follow? Would that make the world safer? In fact, this Administration seems to be moving toward a military posture in which nuclear weapons are considered just like other weapons. Their purpose is not simply to serve as a deterrent. But they would be a usable instrument of military power, like a tank, a fighter aircraft, or a cruise missile. The effect of such a development could well be to legitimize the production of these new nuclear bombs by other countries and make them that much more likely to fall into the hands of enemy states or terrorist groups. At the same time, the Nuclear Posture Review expands the countries included as possible targets, mentioning that "North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies…" Although I would not defend any of these regimes, with the exception of North Korea, none are nuclear powers. These "contingencies" really point to a first use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. And, in September of last year, a National Security Presidential Directive, known as NSPD 17, reversed the long-standing policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding United States use of nuclear weapons. Previous administrations of both political parties, when faced with an uncertain world, have made ambiguous public statements about the United States reserving the right to consider "all options" without any specificity as to which options, or under what conditions. But together, these two new policy initiatives cite contingencies for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons or the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation to a non-nuclear attack. I believe that such an approach is not in our nation's interest, nor is it consistent with our standards and values. In this day and age, a first use of nuclear weapons by the United States should be unthinkable, and responding to a non-nuclear attack with nuclear weapons violates a central tenet of just war and U.S. military tradition. There is no question that in the post 9/11 era a full range of policy options for dealing with new and uncertain events should be on the table. But in my view, nuclear options should not be considered as an extension of conventional options because this inevitably lowers the threshold for use - not necessarily by us, but by others. And our own policies might convince the very nations we are seeking to dissuade from developing nuclear arsenals that they need nuclear bombs to protect themselves against a U.S. attack. Indeed, at a time when the United States brands as "evil" certain countries based, in part, on their pursuit of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction, we must be especially careful in how we consider our own options and contingencies regarding nuclear weapons. Doctrine of Preemption and National Security Strategy In his commencement address at West Point in June 2002, the President called upon all Americans - and I quote: "to be forward - looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives....If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long." This theme was further developed in the National Security Strategy, published in September of last year, which argues that: "the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past...." It goes on to say: "We cannot let our enemies strike first....The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves." On their face, I agree with these statements. I believe that, in fact, as a tactical matter there may be situations where the United States may have to strike first against an imminent threat. However, by creating a specific preemption strategy, and by adapting the concept of "imminent threat" to threats not "fully formed" or to cases where, one day, a foreign government may be a threat to the United States, we set a precedent for others which may well come back to haunt us. It may well lead to a less stable and a more dangerous world. What lessons are others to draw from our words and our actions? For instance, the Administration has stated that one of its top foreign policy goals is to create conditions in which China ultimately becomes an integral part of the world community and adheres to international law and norms of conduct. But what lesson is China to learn from the policy of preemption and the Nuclear Posture Review which set up the contingency for possible nuclear attack on China, if it were to use military action against Taiwan? The Administration's decision to deploy missile defense and to exercise its preemptive doctrine, when combined with the lower thresholds for nuclear use, could well spur China to further expand its own nuclear arsenal, which has been stable at anywhere from 18 to 24 ICBMs. As you know, China has expressed a strong "no first use" policy. It is clearly not in America's interest to see this policy changed and have China deploy hundreds or even thousands of new ICBMs. This would have a disturbing effect not just on U.S.-China relations, but on the entire Asian security environment. Japan could follow, and develop nuclear weapons - South Korea, too, and what about Taiwan? This is the sort of troubling scenario to which the Administration's policies may lead if we are not careful. Conclusion Countering weapons of mass destruction is an international task. More than a dozen countries around the world are believed to be seeking chemical or biological weapons. Even more dangerous, the fissile material needed to build a nuclear weapon is scattered worldwide among our friends and enemies, in places like Russia, Pakistan, and North Korea. The United States needs a strong military and needs to be prepared to use it. But addressing terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires many tools, including sustained and effective alliances and protocols which are enforceable among cooperating nations. The Administration's policy of unilateralism and preemption runs the risk that the United States will become increasingly isolated and alone with alliances and treaties diminishing as effective mechanisms. Instead, the United States will become overly dependent on its military might to protect its interests and its citizens. So today, we stand at an important point in our history. Will the United States recommit our nation to the achievement of workable democratic structures for international law and international institutions, norms of behavior and conduct that others are willing to accept? Or will we turn away from the successful bipartisan tradition of supporting a world ordered by law, and pursue, instead, a unilateralist path? I deeply believe that this Administration is heading into uncharted territory, without adequate reflection or consultation with Congress or our allies. So, it is time to raise the warning flags. As we set a future course for this nation, we should remember that the hallmark of success of America's national security strategy flows from who we are, not just what our military can do. Our strength emanates from our moral stature and our beliefs in truth, in justice, and in freedom. If the long-term goal of our foreign policy is to help build a world where we have more allies than adversaries, more friends than enemies, and more prosperity than poverty, a doctrine of unilateral preemptive military action will most certainly work against that goal. The voices of reason and restraint can still prevail. It will be very interesting to see what happens. And what happens, I believe, over the next several weeks and months could well define how this nation is perceived for generations to come.