



Statement by Senator Feinstein
On Duelfer Report Regarding IRAQ Weapons Threat
October 6, 2004

WASHINGTON — A report released today by Charles Duelfer, the chief U.S. arms inspector, concluded that Saddam Hussein was a diminishing threat at the time of the U.S. invasion and did not possess, or have concrete plans to develop, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The following is a statement by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, on the Iraq Survey Group report.

“The bottom line is that Iraq did not possess, or have concrete plans to develop, nuclear, chemical or biological weapons in 2003 when the war began. There simply is no there, there. Saddam Hussein did not have an active nuclear, chemical or biological weapons program. Considering the statements that were being made by the Administration and the intelligence that was presented to Congress which said otherwise, this is quite disturbing and points once again to failures in the analysis, collection and use of intelligence.

Here are some of the findings that I thought were important:

On nuclear weapons:

- ‘ISG discovered further evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program, but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date.’
- ‘Saddam Hussein ended the nuclear program in 1991 following the Gulf War. ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the program.’

On chemical weapons:

- ‘While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.’
- ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings, that Iraq at OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom) probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulfur mustard within three to six months... (and) A former nerve agent expert indicated that Iraq retained the capability to produce nerve agent in significant quantities within two years, given the import of required phosphorous precursors. However, we have no credible indications that Iraq acquired or attempted to acquire large quantities of these chemicals through its existing procurement networks or sanctioned them.’

On biological weapons:

- ‘In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced BW (biological weapons) quickly. ISG found no direct evidence

that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes.’

On mobile biological weapons labs:

- ‘In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railroad wagons.’
- ‘Prior to OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom), there was information indicating Iraq had planned and built a breakout BW capability, in the form of a set of mobile production units, capable of producing BW agent at short notice in sufficient quantities to weaponize. Although ISG conducted a thorough investigation of every aspect of this information, it has not found any equipment suitable for such a program, nor has ISG positively identified any sites. No documents have been uncovered. Interviews with individuals suspected of involvement have all proved negative.’
- ‘ISG harbors severe doubts about the source’s credibility in regards to the breakout program.’
- ‘ISG thoroughly examined two trailers captured in 2003, suspected of being mobile BW agent production units, and investigated the associated evidence. ISG judges that its Iraqi makers almost certainly designed and built the equipment exclusively for the generation of hydrogen. It is impractical to use the equipment for the production and weaponization of BW agent.’”