“It’s now very clear that the intelligence that led many members of Congress to vote to authorize the use of force was both bad and wrong. I believe that the American people deserve to know whether that intelligence was misused by the Administration in building up the case for war.

The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report on phase one of its investigation, which focused on the actual intelligence on Iraq , has been released. But there is much frustration on the Democratic side about the status of phase two, which deals with the potential misuse of intelligence.

It is our belief that very little progress has been made on phase two, that there has not been an intensive staff effort, and that every time Senator Jay Rockefeller, vice-chairman of the committee, or other members urge action, none is forthcoming.

Therefore this issue was aired in closed session. Six members of the Intelligence Committee were charged with reporting to the full Senate by November 14 on the progress and schedule for completion of phase two of the investigation.”

The following are details of the unanimous vote on Feb. 12, 2004 by the Senate Intelligence Committee to refine the terms of reference of its inquiry into the pre-war intelligence to include an investigation of the possible misuse of the intelligence:

A. The matters set forth in the joint release of the Chairman and Vice Chairman on June 20, 2003 (known as phase one of the investigation):

1. the quantity and quality of U.S. intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, ties to terrorist groups, Saddam Hussein's threat to stability and security in the region, and his repression of his own people;

2. the objectivity, reasonableness, independence, and accuracy of the judgments reached by the Intelligence Community;

3. whether those judgments were properly disseminated to policy makers in the Executive Branch and Congress;

4. whether any influence was brought to bear on anyone to shape their analysis to support policy objectives; and

5. other issues we mutually identify in the course of the Committee's review;

B. the collection of intelligence on Iraq from the end of the Gulf War to the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom;

C. whether public statements and reports and testimony regarding Iraq by U.S. Government officials made between the Gulf War period and the commencement of Operation Iraqi Freedom were substantiated by intelligence information;

D. the postwar findings about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and weapons programs and links to terrorism and how they compare with prewar assessments;

E. prewar intelligence assessments about postwar Iraq;

F. any intelligence activities relating to Iraq conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group (PCTEG) and the Office of Special Plans within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and

G. the use by the Intelligence Community of information provided by the Iraqi National Congress (INC).