Washington, DC - Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) today convened a hearing the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information that examined how effective the USA Patriot Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act have been in combating and preventing domestic terrorism over the past year. The following is Senator Feinstein's prepared statement:

"The September 11 terrorist attacks were a wake-up call for our country. In the aftermath of those attacks, it quickly became apparent that our approach to combating terrorism was, to put it simply, broken.

In response to the failures that led up to September 11, Congress passed a number of key legislative initiatives to beef up homeland security, give law enforcement a greater ability to go after potential terrorists, and protect our borders.

Two of the most important of those initiatives were the USA Patriot Act and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act - each of which passed within just a few months of the terrorist attacks, and each of which contained a number of key provisions and deadlines to enhance our homeland security.

It is these pieces of legislation that are the topic of today's hearing. We are here to ask a number of questions:

. Are the new laws working?

. Are there things we left out?

. Are there improvements to be made?

. And what progress is actually being made by this Administration to implement the new laws?

I supported the USA Patriot Act because I believed that it could help solve some of the problems that may have led to missed opportunities before September 11. But the USA Patriot Act was passed with the knowledge that it had been drafted and negotiated rather quickly-only six weeks elapsed between proposal and passage-and that Congress would need to exercise vigorous oversight to prevent abuses and solve unintended problems. That is one reason why some of the tools in the USA Patriot Act will sunset in a few years.

If the new tools in the USA Patriot Act are working and effective, we should keep them-and even strengthen them. If they are being abused, we should eliminate them or add new safeguards.

The reforms in the USA Patriot Act were spurred by the fact by key agencies in our government had information about the hijackers and their plans before they attacked but did not share this information and did not act on it.

These failures emphasized the fragmentation of antiterrorism efforts within the federal government, and the need for better information sharing. The lack of investigative and intelligence authority was another problem. As Judiciary and Intelligence Committee hearings revealed, the FBI was unable to obtain a search warrant for the computer of accused terrorist Zacarias Moussaoui, who was detained by the FBI and INS in August 2001 after his enrollment in flight simulator training for jumbo jets raised suspicions.

Hearings also demonstrated that the terrorists made ample use of email and the Internet in planning the attacks. The government clearly needed adequate tools to monitor electronic communications. And we learned that the hijackers' operation cost an estimated half million dollars. The government required authority monitor financial transactions more closely. Finally, the disclosure that hijackers had entered the U.S. on legal visas showed a need for immigration reforms.

In short, the USA Patriot Act was an effort to solve some real problems-problems that had helped create a climate which had enabled the September 11 terrorists to stay below the radar screen and carry out their ruthless scheme. And although some expressed concerns over the original proposal, the bill that ended up on the president's desk included a number of important checks and balances and provisions for congressional and judicial oversight.

One important issue is the ability of these agencies to use the tools we gave them. The FBI can best use these new tools if it has a 'road map' to ensure that it knows that the nature, likelihood, and severity of the terrorist theat as well as the intelligence gaps that remain to be addressed. The DOJ Inspector General will testify today that the FBI has not yet performed a comprehensive written assessment of the terrorist threat facing the United States. I know that the FBI is working on such an assessment now, and I hope that they finish it promptly. So I look forward to hearing from the first panel today regarding how the USA Patriot Act is working, and what more might be done to make it work better.

The second panel will discuss the Administration's progress in implementing the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. The Act takes significant steps to improve the capability of federal agencies like the INS and State Department to determine who should or should not be admitted to the United States. The Enhanced Border and Visa Reform Act is premised on two facts:

First, enhancing our intelligence capacity is key to our increased security. Our post-9/11 immigration policies and procedures must permit our federal agencies to timely access to critical and reliable intelligence. Second, our most effective security strategy is to keep out those who mean to do us harm, while admitting those who come to build America and make our country stronger.

Almost one year ago, I held a hearing in this subcommittee on the role of technology in preventing the entry of terrorists in the United States. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the extent to which gaps in our visa and admissions systems have limited the federal government's efforts to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. More importantly, we assessed technological solutions to assist the federal government in preventing potential terrorists from entering the United States.

At the time, five areas of vulnerability in our immigration system came to light:

(1) An unregulated visa waiver program, in which 23 million people arrived with little scrutiny from 29 different countries: Abuse of the visa waiver program poses threats to U.S. national security and increases illegal immigration. For example, one of the co-conspirators in the World Trade Center bombing of 1993 deliberately chose to use a fraudulent Swedish passport to attempt entry into the U.S. because of Sweden's participation in the visa waiver program.

(2) An unmonitored nonimmigrant visa system, in which 7.1 million tourists, business visitors, foreign students, and temporary workers arrive in the United States each year: To date, the INS does not have a reliable tracking system to determine how many of these visitors left the country after their visas expired; the border security legislation enacted in May places the entry-exit system on the fast-track.

(3) The porous nature of our borders along with the INS's unreliable record keeping, have contributed to the agency's inability to keep out criminals and terrorists--and to track their whereabouts once they are here.

(4) In an era in which terrorists use satellite phones and encrypted e-mail, the INS--our nation's gatekeeper--is considered by many observers to still be in the technological dark ages. The agency is still using paper files and archaic computer systems that are often non-functioning, do not communicate with each other, and do not integrate well with other law enforcement systems.

(5) About 40 to 50% of the estimated 7 to 9 million illegal immigrant population are visa overstayers--people who entered the U.S. legally, but later violated the terms of their visas by staying beyond the permitted period of time. Unlike most countries, the United States does not require exit visas--only a form filled out by the visa holder that is often not entered into an INS database for months and, in some cases, a year later.

The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act was crafted to assist agencies like the INS and State Department to plug the existing loopholes in our immigration and visa system.

The purpose of this second panel is to assess the extent to which the INS and State Department have begun implementing these provisions. In particular, I would be interested to learn more about the progress of the State Department, INS, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology in establishing tamper-resistant visas and passports and establishing a nonimmigrant tracking system using biometric data to verify the identity of persons seeking to enter the U.S. We will also examine today the steps the INS is taking in upgrading its information technology systems and building the necessary technological infrastructures so that it can better protect the U.S. ports of entry and our borders from future terrorist attacks.

Finally, I will ask our panels to discuss the extent to which the intelligence community has cooperated with the INS and State Department in timely providing the critical information they need to make the right decisions about whether to admit or deny entry to a foreign national seeking entry.

As we enter into these discussions today, it is important to recognize that increased technology, alone, is not a substitute for adequate number of personnel, adequate training for that personnel, and a cooperative relationship and spirit among the agencies charged with protecting our nation's borders, as well as our national security.

Today's hearing will examine the agencies use of available technologies to implement the provisions of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. Future hearings will examine some of the other important steps we can take to ensure that the underlying goals of the Act are achieved."

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