Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein
in Opposition to a Resolution Making Yucca Mountain
the National Repository for Nuclear Waste
July 9, 2002

Washington, DC - The following is Senator Feinstein's statement in opposition to the resolution that would establish Yucca Mountain as the National Repository for Nuclear Waste:

"I am voting against this resolution. I support the development of a long-term strategy of storing our nation's nuclear waste. However, a single storage repository is not the answer to our nuclear waste problem. I have three major concerns about the proposed Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository:

Based on these factors, I believe it would be a mistake to bring all of our nation's nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. Instead of a single repository, it would be better to develop regional nuclear waste permanent storage facilities which would increase overall storage capacity and reduce risks associated with transporting waste great distances.

Today nuclear waste is stored at 131 facilities in 39 states. These facilities hold nearly 47,500 metric tons of nuclear waste. This amount is growing rapidly. Within 40 years, it is estimated that our country will have generated nearly 108,000 metric tons of nuclear waste. The Yucca Mountain repository, as I understand it, is authorized to hold only 70,000 metric tons. So at our current rate of nuclear waste production, we will have generated this amount by the earliest estimated date of the repository's opening in 2010. In fact, we may generate the full 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste before the site ever opens.

What is the point of creating a storage site that will be filled to capacity before it even opens? I am very concerned about the environmental risks surrounding the site storage. DOE was supposed to recommend or reject the Yucca Mountain repository with geologic considerations to be the primary criteria. I find it disturbing that the suitability of the Yucca Mountain repository has instead focused on container material.

These titanium waste containers are DOE's principal method of providing safety and security of the nuclear waste and repository and ensuring the protection of surrounding areas. Yet how can we be so confident in our support of such containers when we don't know about their longevity and durability?

The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, which was established by Congress specifically to ensure that a repository adequately protects the public health and the environment and it has voiced similar concerns. Last year, the Board termed the technical basis for DOE's repository performance estimates as weak to moderate.'

As a result, the NWTRB has limited confidence in current performance estimates generated by the DOE's performance assessment model. The Board has found that high temperatures in the DOE's repository design increase uncertainties and decrease confidence in the performance of these metal storage containers. According to Dr. Jared Cohon, the Chairman of the Board, 'gaps in data and basic understanding cause important uncertainties in the concepts and assumptions on which the DOE's performance estimates are now based.'

The half-life of these titanium storage containers is still unknown. Scientists have found that the first container failures could occur after 10,000 years, although one board member said it was 'hopeless' to know how long the container would last, given just a few years of research. Perhaps failure could occur much sooner. In comparison, Uranium 235, the basic fuel used by nuclear reactors, has a half-life of 704 million years. It would be simply irresponsible for us to bury such hazardous nuclear waste when we don't have a good idea about how long the containers could hold up.

One of the most significant problems found at the site is the amount of subsurface water present under Yucca Mountain. Water promotes corrosion and movement of radioactive material and its presence in a repository is a serious drawback. As the titanium casks erode over time, we could face a potential disaster as this water becomes contaminated and flows into the water table.

California counties have expressed their rightful concerns of subsurface water at Yucca Mountain surfacing at populated areas downstream of the site. For instance, Inyo County in California, with a population of 17,945, lies downstream of the proposed repository. Contaminated water could very easily spread from the repository directly into their towns and homes. Death Valley, one of our nation's ecological and environmental treasures, is also only about 20 miles from the repository. Water contaminated with nuclear waste could destroy one of the jewels of our National Park System.

DOE refutes the idea of possible harm of water contamination based on the titanium casks the Department has proposed to store the nuclear waste. Yet in March of 2001, the NWTRB wrote to DOE expressing its concern that important water flow processes around Yucca Mountain remain poorly understood and should be further studied.

The Board has criticized the lack of critical corrosion data on the titanium casks in the DOE's basic design concept. According to the Board, "we are betting the performance of the systems on the long term performance of these effectively new materials." The fact is we simply do not know enough about the durability of these containers and how they will hold up under intense natural conditions for thousands of years.

If we are so confident of the safety and durability of these titanium storage casks, why not use them to store nuclear waste at or near existing reactor sites and thereby eliminate the risk of transporting these hazardous materials across the country?

The most immediate question that need to be answered, however, is how will we transport all of our nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. While some argue that the repository will increase national security by decreasing the number of storage sites, the transportation of nuclear waste to the site would actually create thousands of moving targets.

In order to move the nation's nuclear waste to the Yucca Mountain repository, DOE would have to transport thousands of metric tons of nuclear waste across the country and those shipments would take decades just to move the waste that has already been generated. Keep in mind that nuclear power provides a quarter of our nation's energy needs and we generate hundreds of spent nuclear fuel rods each day and nearly 2,200 metric tons of nuclear waste each year.

If we had a way to magically move all of the nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain, it might be safer to have a single repository. However, this is not the case and the transportation of nuclear waste poses unnecessary risks for accidents and attacks. According to DOE, it would take an estimated 24 years for the full 70,000 metric tons of nuclear waste to be transported to Yucca Mountain. DOE has not yet determined exactly how this nuclear waste would be transported. The Department estimates that it would take 53,000 trips by truck over the proposed 24 year time period. If the nuclear waste traveled by train, that scenario would involve an estimated 10,700 rail shipments.

The site is scheduled to open in 2010 according to DOE's earliest predictions and at the end of all shipments in 2034, there would still be n early 42,000 metric tons of commercial nuclear waste stored in 63 nuclear power plant sites in 31 states and about 7,000 metric tons of DOE generated waste stored in 4 states. This is why I believe a single repository is not capable of meeting our long-term nuclear waste storage needs.

Such shipments present unnecessary risks in transporting numerous shipments of hazardous materials from New England to Nevada. As a result of this plan, significant amounts of nuclear waste will undoubtedly move through or near populated urban areas, potentially jeopardizing the safety of millions of Americans. And commercial spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power reactors would comprise about 90 percent of the waste shipped to the repository. DOE has acknowledged that this waste is "usually intensely radioactive."

According to DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) more than 123 million people currently live in 703 counties traversed by DOE's proposed highway routes and 106 million live in counties along DOE's proposed rail routes.

Using potential truck and rail transportation routes identified by DOE, the Environmental Working Group, a national environmental research organization, estimated that waste shipments to the Yucca Mountain repository could pass within a mile or less of 14,510 schools, 933 hospitals and the homes of 38.5 million people. When the distance from routes is expanded to five miles, waste shipments could pass 36,228 schools, 1,831 hospitals and the homes of 109 million people.

Preliminary routes in Southern California slate waste from the Diablo Canyon power plant to be shipped about 200 miles on a barge to Port Hueneme in suburban Ventura County just north of Los Angeles, which is one of California's five busiest ports and the nation's biggest export site for citrus. These shipments pose potential threats to some of the most densely populated areas in the U.S.

Additionally, routine radiation from shipping casks poses a significant health threat to workers handling such shipments. In the most extreme example, motor carrier safety inspectors could receive cumulative doses large enough to increase their risk of cancer death by 10 percent or more and their risk of other serious health effects by 40 percent or more.

According to the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects, public perception of transportation risks could also result in economic costs to those communities along shipping routes. Even without an accident or incident, property values near these routes could decline by 3% or more. In the event of an accident, residential property values along shipping routes could decline between 8% and 34%, depending on the severity of the accident.

DOE takes great pride in its record of safe transportation of hazardous materials for over more than 30 years. During that time, there have been only eight accidents and none of them resulted in the harmful release of radioactive material. However, during that time period, we were moving fewer than 100 shipments per year.

Over the next 24 years, there would be an estimated 2,200 shipments per year heading to the Yucca Mountain repository alone. There would also be more than 10,700 cross-country shipments occurring at an average of 450 per year. This enormous increase in shipments would greatly increase potential accidents. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 457,000 large trucks were involved in traffic crashes in the year 2000 alone.

And according to the FEIS, a very severe highway or rail accident could release radioactive materials from a shipping container, resulting in radiation exposures to members of the public and latent cancer fatalities among the exposed population.

The July 2001 Baltimore rail tunnel fire has been cited as an example of the dangers of shipping nuclear waste by train. The fire burned for three days with temperatures as high as 1500 degrees Fahrenheit. A single rail cask in such an accident could have released enough radioactive material to contaminate an area of 32 square miles. In addition to the harm inflicting surrounding populations, the FEIS estimates the clean-up costs of such an accident could potentially reach $10 billion.

Failure to clean up the contamination of such an accident could cause 4,000 to 28,000 cancer deaths over the next 50 years. Between 200 and 1,400 latent cancer fatalities would be expected from exposures during the first year.

A successful terrorist attack using high energy explosives could result in similar destruction and damage.

The FEIS concedes that a high-energy explosive device could rupture the wall of a truck cask, leading to the dispersal of contaminants into the environment. A single blast resulting in 90 percent penetration of a truck cask could lead to 300 to 1,800 cancer fatalities. Full perforation of a cask could cause 3,000 to 18,000 cancer fatalities. Cleanup and recovery costs of such an incident would exceed $10 billion. These threats should be taken very seriously and this assessment furthers my belief that the long and complex transportation of nuclear waste to a single site is a threat to our national security.

Based on these concerns, I do not believe that Yucca Mountain is the answer to our current nuclear waste security nor our long term nuclear waste storage problem. According to Dr. Victor Gilinsky, a former Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Yucca Mountain is not needed to continue, or even expand, nuclear power use. There is ample opportunity to expand existing, NRC-approved, on-site storage. As he testified before the Senate Energy Committee:

'The important thing now is to recognize that there is no immediate crisis, that there is time to do this and to do a good job and responsible job in terms of safety and security, and to do it at a much lower cost to taxpayers than Yucca Mountain represents.'

I believe a regional system will provide us with both immediate and long-term results. Immediate in the sense that we can explore expanding storage at current NRC-approved sites. Long-term in the sense that it will produce a system of regional permanent storage sites that will meet our long-term nuclear waste storage needs.

I cannot support a site that does not have the capacity to meet our nation's long-term nuclear waste storage needs and poses serious risks to our environment and national security. A system of regional storage repositories could eliminate these risks and provide the adequate and safe permanent storage of nuclear waste that our country needs."

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